The Strike Was Lawful. The Outrage Is Not

The claim that a reported U.S. strike on a Venezuelan dock was illegal or reckless reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how American power is actually exercised. Not in theory. In practice. The United States did not invent a novel legal rationale or contort the law to justify a political impulse. It relied on authorities that have governed counter narcotics operations, sanctions enforcement, and national security action for decades. The law is not ambiguous. The public debate is.

Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro is not a sovereign state suffering from criminal spillover. It is a regime structured around criminal enterprise. Drug trafficking, sanctions evasion, and cooperation with hostile foreign actors are not tolerated deviations. They are core revenue streams. When a government deliberately uses its territory as an operational platform for transnational crime that harms the United States, it forfeits the protections normally afforded to responsible states.

U.S. law has long treated international narcotics trafficking as a national security threat, not merely a policing problem. Congress made that judgment explicit years ago. Statutes authorizing the dismantling of foreign drug networks extend not just to individuals, but to the infrastructure that sustains them. Executive authorities targeting transnational criminal organizations and entities that materially support threats to U.S. security reinforce the same principle. A dock used to load narcotics or sanctioned commodities is not civilian infrastructure in any meaningful sense. It is an operational asset of a designated criminal enterprise.

Presidential authority does not end at sanctions. As Commander in Chief, the President possesses constitutional authority to use force abroad to protect U.S. persons and interests without prior congressional authorization in limited circumstances. That view is neither novel nor controversial inside the executive branch. It has been affirmed repeatedly through formal legal opinions across administrations of both parties. Limited, targeted actions taken to disrupt ongoing threats fall squarely within that framework.

Much of the criticism rests on confusion about the distinction between military operations and intelligence activities. Title 10 governs overt military action. Title 50 governs intelligence activities, including covert action. Both are lawful. Both are constrained. The difference is attribution, not legality. Covert action requires a presidential finding, rigorous legal review, and notification to Congress. It exists precisely to allow calibrated responses when overt military force would be escalatory or diplomatically counterproductive. That is not a loophole. It is intentional design.

International law arguments fare no better. The United Nations Charter restricts the use of force against another state’s territorial integrity, but it also preserves the inherent right of self defense. For decades, the United States has interpreted that right to include action against non state actors operating from sovereign territory when the host government is unwilling or unable to address the threat. A regime that actively facilitates criminal activity does not get to invoke sovereignty as a shield.

Invocations of the War Powers Resolution are similarly misplaced. The statute was designed to regulate sustained hostilities, not discrete operations. Every modern administration has maintained that limited, targeted uses of force do not trigger its sixty day clock. That interpretation may be politically contested, but it is legally defensible and longstanding. The law does not require paralysis in the face of ongoing threats.

The real objection is not legal. It is political. Some argue that any use of force short of full scale intervention is destabilizing. Others argue that confrontation should be avoided entirely. Both positions ignore the obvious reality that Venezuela under Maduro is already destabilizing the region. It exports narcotics, corruption, and authoritarian influence. Inaction is not restraint. It is abdication.

Restoring democratic governance in Venezuela is not ideological adventurism. It is a security imperative. Venezuela was once a functioning democracy with institutions capable of governing responsibly. Its collapse was engineered through corruption, repression, and the systematic criminalization of the state. Allowing that model to persist guarantees permanent instability on the United States’ doorstep.

Targeted action against regime enabled criminal infrastructure is not an act of war. It is enforcement. It imposes cost without occupation, signals resolve without overreach, and reasserts a basic principle that geography does not confer immunity. That is not recklessness. It is restraint, properly applied.

The legal frameworks governing U.S. intelligence and military action were built for moments like this. They permit decisive action within the law, not outside it. What unsettles critics is not legal uncertainty. It is the realization that American power still carries consequence. That discomfort may be fashionable. It is also dangerous.